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5Preface | Summary
Preface
•  For many in Europe, the values and norms that underpin the 
continent’s social model are at the heart of what it means 
to be European.
•  Welfare states perform a number of redistributive functions 
and protect the vulnerable. Contrary to negative portrayals, 
welfare states also invest in human and social capital. All 
European citizens both use and contribute to the welfare 
state at different stages of their lives.
•  Pressures on public finances, and the burden that social 
spending imposes on the ‘productive’ parts of economies, 
raise questions about whether European countries can still 
afford their welfare states.
•  Welfare systems first designed 50 or more years ago need 
to be recast to confront today’s challenges. They must 
accommodate the extensive societal transformations 
associated with population ageing, closer global economic 
integration and the spillover effects of climate change.
•  Welfare states will also have to adapt to new social risks 
resulting from the changing nature of European economies, 
especially evolving patterns of work and employment. They 
will have to use resources more efficiently and make the 
most of relevant technological advances, without unduly 
sacrificing key principles such as solidarity.
•  A number of dilemmas about appropriate forms of decision-
making and democratic oversight surround efforts to reform 
welfare, but there are reasons to be optimistic about the 
future of the European social model. Well-designed welfare 
states can promote sustainable growth in Europe and be a 
competitive asset.
In all the countries of the European Union, the welfare state has 
come under intense scrutiny as a result of budgetary pressures 
and wider societal developments. The Vision Europe initiative 
has chosen to focus this year on the future of the welfare state, 
and aims to develop innovative policy recommendations on 
how to ensure the long-term sustainability of national welfare 
systems in Europe. This introductory paper is designed to set 
the scene for the challenges currently facing the welfare state 
in Europe. Specific facets of welfare state policy are being 
reviewed in more detail in three project working groups. All 
these issues will be examined in the first Vision Europe Summit, 
which is due to take place in Berlin on 17–18 November 2015.
Vision Europe Summit is a consortium of think-tanks and 
foundations that came together in 2015 to address some of 
Europe’s most pressing public policy challenges. Through 
research, publications and an annual summit, it aims to 
provide a forum for debate and a source of recommendations 
for improving evidence-based policy-making at both national 
and EU levels.
Participating Organizations:
• Bertelsmann Stiftung (Gütersloh)
• Bruegel (Brussels)
• Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (Lisbon)
• Chatham House (London)
• Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino)
• Jacques Delors Institute (Paris)
• The Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra (Helsinki)
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competition from emerging economies with lower labour and 
social welfare costs are also raising fundamental questions 
that Europe’s leaders have struggled to answer. These include 
dilemmas about the extent of the state’s responsibility to its 
citizens and, specifically, whether governments can or should 
maintain comprehensive welfare systems in the future.
In fact, Merkel’s data are somewhat inaccurate. The EU’s welfare 
spending was 40 per cent of the world total in 2012 (see 
Figure 1), while its share of nominal world GDP in 2014 was 24 
per cent (at current prices and current exchange rates, and thus 
There is a growing sense that the European social model is 
unsustainable and in need of reform. As the German chancellor, 
Angela Merkel, is fond of claiming, the European Union (EU) 
accounts for roughly 7 per cent of the world’s population and 
25 per cent of its GDP, but over 50 per cent of its welfare 
spending. The implication is that Europe’s welfare states are 
not only generous in comparison with provisions elsewhere, 
but will become unaffordable without major recasting. They 
undeniably face a range of demographic, fiscal and other 
pressures, exacerbated by weak economic growth or recession 
since the 2008–09 financial crisis. Changing work patterns and 
Introduction
Figure 1 | Global social protection expenditure aggregates, 2012 or latest (% of total)
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Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Taiwan, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, Virgin Islands (US), West Bank and Gaza.
Sources: EUROSTAT (for social expenditure in EU member states); OECD SOCX database (for social expenditure in non-EU OECD countries); 
ILOSTAT (for social expenditure in non-EU non-OECD countries); World Bank Data (for GDP and population data).
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The real gap in social spending is between the ‘old’ industrial 
economies and the emerging markets, including China, India, 
Brazil and South Korea. For these countries, social spending is 
a small fraction of that in the more advanced economies, but 
it is likely to rise as their prosperity increases and they seek 
to strengthen welfare provision. As a result, the EU’s share of 
global social spending can be expected to fall simply because 
the share accounted for by the rest of the world will rise. It is 
already clear, for example, that China will soon have to take 
steps to deal with its rapidly ageing population by introducing 
higher social support to maintain the incomes of older people.
making no allowance for differing price levels).1 In addition, as 
Figure 2 shows, per capita spending on social protection in the 
United States and Japan was broadly the same as in Europe, 
higher in Switzerland and Australia, and very slightly lower in 
Canada.
1  An alternative means of measurement, converting national data using 
‘purchasing power parities’ (reflecting differences in price levels), would 
lower the EU’s shares of global GDP and social protection spending by 
about 20 per cent, and push up the corresponding shares of emerging 
market economies.
Sources: EUROSTAT (for social expenditure in EU member states); OECD SOCX database (for social expenditure in non-EU OECD countries); 
ILOSTAT (for social expenditure in non-EU non-OECD countries); World Bank Data (for GDP and population data).
Figure 2 | Social protection expenditure and GDP per capita in EU and selected countries, US$, 
              2012 or latest
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While Merkel’s point is that something will need to ‘give’ in 
Europe’s approach to its welfare model, the affordability of the 
welfare state is a tricky concept. The linked concern that high 
welfare spending is undermining European competitiveness 
has to be looked at with care, even if it is accepted that 
adjustments need to be made. Today’s political and economic 
context for such an adjustment is not benign. In the wake 
of the financial crisis and a protracted recession in parts of 
Europe, national politics is fragmenting in both the more and 
less wealthy members of the EU.
Populist parties are on the rise, as seen in the results of the 2014 
European Parliament elections and several national elections 
since then. There is a pervasive concern that neither national 
governments nor the EU as a whole will prevent globalization 
from further constraining median wages while widening income 
inequality.
This paper aims to lay out the scope of the challenge ahead. 
It starts by describing the core functions of the welfare state. 
Second, it outlines the evolution of particular welfare models 
across Europe and introduces the concept of social investment. 
Third, it assesses the ways in which socio-economic change 
threatens welfare state sustainability. It then considers the 
dilemmas for the welfare state and the potential for recasting 
the welfare model to cope more effectively with the challenges 
it faces.
Three areas for deeper research are suggested. These will form 
the basis of an additional series of papers, focusing on the 
economic, social and governance dimensions of the welfare 
challenge. These papers will suggest changes in strategy and 
specific policy approaches to welfare provision, with the aim 
of enabling European countries to achieve sustainable welfare 
systems for the coming decades.
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The result is that much of the debate about designing a welfare 
state and judging the pros and cons of its different components 
is influenced by political ideology. For some, the state should 
play a central role in income redistribution in order to sustain 
welfare budgets. For others, the capacity to deliver social 
welfare is a by-product of a less interventionist approach 
to economic governance. Inevitably, the particular political 
outlook then influences the methods by which a government 
seeks to deliver welfare policies.
A good example lies in healthcare. In the United States, the 
political consensus long held that this should principally be a 
private responsibility, leaving the state to provide support only 
to those unable to afford private health insurance. The deeply 
politicized and increasingly contested nature of this settlement 
was exposed by the difficulties that President Barack Obama 
faced in passing the Affordable Care Act. In the United 
Kingdom, the prevailing political consensus is that the state 
should have principal responsibility for healthcare, providing 
universal coverage through the central government budget and 
thereby avoiding the market failures that have long blighted 
the US system.
Welfare state functions
Overall, the welfare state fulfils three analytically distinctive 
functions:4
•  The ‘Robin Hood’ function of redistributing in various 
ways from better-off members of society to those faced with 
material or other deprivation or subject to higher social 
risks. Welfare states comprise institutions and mechanisms 
designed to protect against these risks by delivering poverty 
4  Drawing on, and extending, Nicholas Barr, The Economics of the Welfare 
State (5th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
European countries developed their welfare systems during a 
period when the region’s benign demographic profile could 
support extensive social spending and when solid economic 
growth made it affordable. The political economy of Europe 
has been defined since the 1950s by the development in each 
European country of a more or less comprehensive welfare 
model, whereby the state has taken a central role in providing a 
range of social benefits, the most costly of which are pensions, 
support for the poor, social housing and healthcare. In parallel, 
all EU countries have sought to regulate labour markets 
and ensure a fair deal for workers. One of the most complex 
challenges currently facing European governments and societies 
is to reconcile these commitments to welfare provision, which 
are widely supported politically, with pressures that may make 
them unsustainable economically.
Purposes and design
The European ‘welfare state’ eludes concrete or universal 
definition. Its principal purpose, however, has been to help 
governments reconcile the often competing dynamics of 
capitalism, equity and democracy. Free-market economies have 
an inherent tendency towards income inequality and distribute 
economic power unequally, while democratic government seeks 
to distribute political power more evenly and to promote 
notions of social equality.2 In relation to European integration, 
the underlying challenge can be seen as a variant on Dani 
Rodrik’s ‘trilemma’, in which there is mutual incompatibility 
between global economic integration, the nation state and 
democracy.3 In his analysis, only two out of the three can 
simultaneously be sustained. 
2  See Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, The Political Economy of European 
Welfare Capitalism (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
3  Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and 
Democracy Can’t Coexist (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).
What Is the Welfare State?
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Consumption smoothing
Through the provisions of cash benefits for pensioners and for 
families with young children, a welfare state allows individuals 
to smooth out their financial expenditure and consumption 
over their lifetime.
Pension schemes allow individuals to redistribute income from 
their younger to their older selves in a secure manner. Student 
loans enable students to consume more than their current 
income allows through claims on their future income. Child 
benefits allow families with young children to consume more 
than they could otherwise at a financially constrained point in 
their lives.
Risk-sharing
The welfare state provides insurance against unexpected and 
unacceptable changes in individuals’ living standards, through 
mechanisms such as unemployment and disability benefits. At 
the same time it has to guard against eliminating incentives 
to take well-judged risks that offer rewards for individuals 
and society alike. An example would be overly generous 
unemployment benefits that discourage the search for new 
employment. Different modes of risk-sharing are:
•  Actuarial insurance: individuals pool risks to be insured 
against losses from certain events. Benefits from actuarial 
insurance are strictly related to one’s own contributions. 
There is no systematic redistribution from rich to poor but 
rather from ‘lucky’ to ‘unlucky’, i.e. from those people who 
pay for the insurance but never suffer from the insured loss 
to those who do.
•  Social insurance: the same pooling principle as actuarial 
insurance, but typically with compulsory membership, 
relief, providing social housing, redistributing income 
and reducing social exclusion. Labour market regulations 
protect against unfair dismissal and ensure rights for 
temporary workers. Social risks have evolved over time and 
now include aspects such as one-parent families and the 
isolation of old-age pensioners from their families.
•  The ‘piggy bank’ function through which the welfare 
state enables citizens to insure themselves against social 
hardship and to spread their income more securely over 
their lifetime, with pensions being the main element.
•  The social investment function that enables the state to 
invest in the nation’s human and (harder to define) social 
capital.5 This includes kindergarten care, state education 
from primary level through university, out-of-work training 
and various types of work-related tax benefits.
In macroeconomic terms, state welfare budgets serve as 
‘automatic stabilizers’ against the effects of economic disruption 
at the individual and national levels. More specifically, they 
address a number of policy priorities, including those listed 
below.
Macro- and microeconomic efficiency
A welfare state reacts to market failures wherever there are 
deviations from optimal outcomes, in particular uninsurable 
risks. Government intervention is therefore justified, even in 
the most libertarian systems, because it increases economic 
efficiency over time. Improving aggregate as well as individual 
economic efficiency lies at the heart of most aspects of welfare 
provision.
5  See Anton Hemerijck, Changing Welfare States (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).
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perhaps justified because the market would not insure 
against the risks in question.
•  Redistribution from rich to poor: risk-sharing mechanisms 
can entail redistributive elements, such as pension schemes 
that provide higher benefits relative to paid contributions 
for lower-paid than for higher-paid workers.
Relieving poverty
An essential objective of the modern welfare state is poverty 
relief, with nearly all EU countries offering some form of 
minimum income guarantee and many undertaking to offer 
basic shelter. Whether this entails elimination of poverty or 
alleviation of poverty is subject to political decisions and 
depends on a number of factors.
Reducing inequality
Reducing inequality entails both vertical redistribution (from 
rich to poor households through progressive taxation) and 
horizontal redistribution (ensuring that households with 
similar characteristics, such as age, family size etc., are treated 
equivalently).
Addressing social exclusion
Addressing social exclusion is a broader and more normative 
objective of the welfare state. It includes increasing social 
solidarity and the dignity of welfare clients by delivering 
benefits without unnecessary stigma.
Box 1 |  How do governments distribute social 
benefits?
Cash benefits
_  Social insurance: entitlements to benefits are based on 
past contributions, with payments triggered by specific 
contingencies (e.g. unemployment, retirement or ill 
health). Examples include replacement incomes for the 
unemployed, pensions and disability allowances.
_  Non-contributory benefits: benefits available to all, 
without any obligation to contribute or means-testing 
(e.g. child benefit in many countries).
_  Social assistance: means-tested benefits for those in 
poverty.
Benefits in kind
_  Benefits in kind provide welfare through the free 
provision of services, such as healthcare, social housing 
(either free or at rents below market levels) and 
education. The three main issues that policy-makers 
need to address are how these benefits are financed, 
how they are delivered and how quality can be assured.
_  In most countries healthcare is financed to a large 
degree through the state, since the market for 
healthcare does not conform to the principles that are 
expected of a well-functioning market (being subject, 
for example, to imperfect information or incomplete 
provision of insurance that can deny protection to many 
of the most needy).
_  This explains why the United States, which relies heavily 
on private finance, spent almost twice as much (16.2 
per cent of GDP) on healthcare in 2012 as the average 
for other OECD countries (8.8 per cent of GDP). By 
contrast, the figures were 8.9 per cent for the United 
Kingdom, 9.1 per cent for Sweden and 10.9 per cent 
for Germany. The mode of delivery, on the other hand, 
varies in different countries (from mostly public to 
mixed forms to mostly private) since it interferes less 
with efficiency.
_  For similar reasons, school education is predominantly 
both financed and delivered publicly in most countries, 
while the provision of university education is more 
diverse.
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Some of the differences between EU countries can be discerned 
from considering the scale and mix of welfare spending (see 
Figures 4 and 5). These differences partly reflect national 
traditions and preferences, but also the differing economic 
conditions in countries. Per capita spending on welfare is 
lower as a share of GDP in the lowest-income EU countries, 
but clearly higher in France than in the United Kingdom, two 
countries with similar levels of GDP. Yet it is also noteworthy 
that per capita spending levels are similar across the northern 
European countries. Among the headings of welfare spending, 
it is striking just how stable the shares of old-age outlays were 
up to the crisis and how they appear to have been protected 
(and have indeed increased) since 2008. Healthcare, similarly, 
Welfare spending in Europe
It is clear from recent data that governments continued to 
allow spending on social protection to increase before and after 
the financial crisis, whether because it played its automatic 
stabilizing function or in order to protect particular segments 
of the population for political reasons, and that all of this 
occurred despite the pervasive ‘austerity’ narrative (see Figure 
3). More generally, it is hard to cut or even restructure social 
benefits for the simple political economy reason that those 
who lose out protest loudly. This leads many governments to 
opt instead for less conspicuous cuts in public investment 
when public finances are under pressure.
Source: EUROSTAT.
Figure 3 | Social protection benefits – all functions (expenditure as % of GDP)
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* EU is taken as EU-15 for 1993–99, EU-25 for 2000–04, EU-27 for 2005–07, EU-28 for 2008–12.
Source: EUROSTAT.
Figure 5 | Expenditure on social protection benefits – by function (as % of GDP in EU*, 1993–2012)
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Figure 4 | Expenditure on social protection benefits – all functions (PPS* basis per capita, 
              relative to GDP per capita, 2012)
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fees for dental care. With public finances under pressure, how to 
fund welfare states will be an increasingly delicate governance 
issue.
The main differences between EU countries are in the proportion 
of revenue raised from explicit social charges, the consequence 
of which is that general taxation has to make up the difference. 
At one extreme, Denmark generates only a fifth of the income 
through charges on employers and workers, whereas in Estonia 
the proportion is four times as high. Differences between the 
share paid by workers as opposed to their employers are also 
noteworthy, with Slovenia and Germany among those asking 
workers to shoulder more of the burden.
has been gently increasing its share. The share going to 
unemployment benefit, albeit small, jumped after 2007 as the 
number of unemployed people rose. Overall, as a share of GDP, 
social spending has varied less than might be expected, only 
jumping in 2009 when GDP, the denominator of the ratio, fell 
sharply.
Governments across Europe raise the revenue needed to meet 
their welfare commitments from a mix of explicit social charges 
levied on employers and employees, general taxation and some 
charges for specific benefits (see Figure 6). Even in the United 
Kingdom, for example, ‘free at the point of need’ healthcare 
includes a flat charge for some drug prescriptions and various 
Source: EUROSTAT.
Figure 6 | Social protection receipts – by type (% of total receipts in 2012)
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Evolving European Models of Welfare States
explained by Alan Milward in a seminal book.7 What transpired 
was a division of labour between the European ‘project’ 
(providing economic integration and fostering growth) and the 
nation state (providing social welfare and ensuring that the 
benefits of higher growth were equitably distributed among 
different social groups).
From the oil shocks of the 1970s onwards, the conjunction 
of rising inflation and slowing growth – what came to be 
known as ‘stagflation’ – called into question the prevailing 
economic orthodoxy, leading to what is sometimes called 
neoliberalism. This was characterized by renewed reliance 
on market mechanisms, and a belief in the need for smaller 
government and sound money (balancing fiscal budgets, low 
inflation, etc.). In subsequent decades, the paradox emerged of 
there being consistent pressure on, and questioning of, public 
spending on social policies while surprisingly stable amounts of 
money were spent on social protection systems.
‘Worlds of welfare’
Nevertheless, differing welfare models evolved over this 
period. In parallel with work on ‘varieties of capitalism’, these 
models have been categorized in various ways by academics, 
with perhaps the best known being Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s 
‘worlds of welfare capitalism’.8 He identified three distinct 
models of welfare state within Europe, marked by levels of 
‘decommodification’ (i.e. income support for those outside 
the labour market), ‘stratification’ (i.e. the effects of welfare 
policies on social class and mobility) and the different providers 
of welfare (i.e. public, private, etc.). Later a fourth, southern 
7  Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (2nd edition, 
London: Routledge, 2000).
8  Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).
Welfare states in Europe were largely constructed in their 
present form following the Second World War, but reflect 
longer-term national traditions and accommodations. Despite 
considerable diversity in the core values of the respective 
national welfare systems in Europe, many norms are common 
across the continent. It is reasonable, therefore, to speak of a 
distinctive European social model, often most easily defined in 
terms of what other parts of the world lack. Pascal Lamy has 
referred to the model as embodying ‘a European way of life’ 
and described it as ‘a civilized version of globalization’.6 Its key 
features include protection of workers and a commitment to 
social protection of the vulnerable and to limiting inequalities. 
There are, indisputably, components of national social provision 
which have special status: to Britons, the National Health 
Service has totemic status; in France the word ‘solidarity’ is 
central to welfare politics; and citizens of the Nordic countries 
set great store by a broad definition of equality.
Welfare systems in the postwar socio-
economic paradigm
Welfare states in Europe were a key component of the postwar 
economic management paradigm, in what is sometimes 
referred to as a golden age of economic growth up to the 
early 1970s. Among the attributes of this paradigm were 
reconciling democracy and capitalism, allowing high growth 
and investment, and at the same time significantly reducing 
insecurities (poverty, unemployment, inadequate healthcare, 
etc.) for the working population. Full employment was an 
underlying objective. Welfare systems also contributed to 
the legitimization of the nation state in the postwar era, as 
6  EurActiv, ‘Lamy: Social model distinguishes Europe from the rest of the 
world’, 4 February 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections-2014/ 
pascal-lamy-interview-interview-533239.
Evolving European Models of Welfare States
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European ‘world’ was added based on work by Maurizio Ferrera.9 
(See Box 2.) It is a moot point whether the systems put in place 
in the course of the transitions from socialism of the countries 
of central and eastern Europe constitute a fifth model.
The ‘worlds of welfare capitalism’ approach sets out ‘ideal-
type’ models rather than being a precise description of welfare 
approaches in specific countries. However, it has had an 
enduring influence, even though the reality is more nuanced 
and substantial changes have occurred over the past quarter 
of a century in many countries. Developments since the 
seminal work of Esping-Andersen was published often belie 
easy categorization, as the examples of France and Germany 
show, given that they display very different characteristics in 
their welfare regimes, despite being part of the same ‘world’. 
Germany, in particular, has undergone extensive welfare reforms 
since reunification; these have facilitated a much increased 
employment rate compared with France.
Social investment as a new European model
Since the mid-1990s, a shift in welfare provision towards social 
investment has become evident. Although the term allows for 
different interpretations,10 the ‘social investment state’ can 
be understood as a concept in which the state tries to foster 
adaptability, flexibility, security and employability. It has many 
roots, including the activation policies already prominent in 
Sweden from as early as the 1930s and the notion of social 
protection as a productive factor that became prominent in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in the 1990s. It 
can also be regarded politically as a means of legitimizing 
9  Maurizio Ferrera, ‘The “Southern Model” of Welfare in Social Europe’, 
Journal of European Social Policy, 6:1, 1996, pp. 17–37.
10  Frank Vandenbroucke and Koen Vleminckx, ‘Disappointing poverty trends: 
is the social investment state to blame?’, Journal of European Social 
Policy, 21:5, 2011, pp. 450–71.
Box 2 | ‘Worlds’ of welfare capitalism*
Social-democratic/Scandinavian model
_ Prevalent in Denmark, Sweden.
_  Generous replacement of market earnings through the 
state.
_  Stratification of universal social citizenship/social 
welfare as a universal right.
_ State as main provider of social welfare.
_  Characterized by high social expenditure, active 
labour market policies and increased public-sector 
employment.
Corporatist/Continental model, sometimes also known as 
‘Bismarckian’
_  Northern-central Europe, typified by Germany and 
France.
_  Varying degrees of decommodification and 
stratification, preserving the status of workers.
_  Main provider of welfare is the family, but contributory 
principle ties many benefits to employment history.
_  Basic security supplemented with contributory benefits 
(pensions, unemployment, etc.).
_ Opening up jobs through earlier retirement.
Liberal/Anglo-Saxon model
_ United Kingdom, Ireland.
_ Minimal decommodification; stigmatizing stratification.
_  Seeks to increase demand for labour through 
liberalization and wage flexibility.
_ Mostly private forms of insurance.
_ Benefits comparatively low and linked to means-testing.
_  Poverty relief through minimum wages, but less of a 
focus on equality.
Southern model
_ Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal.
_ Insider-based entitlements.
_ Extended family as core unit.
_ Income maintenance.
_  Strong jobs protection – favouring, for example, full-
time over temporary workers.
*  Based on concepts developed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Maurizio 
Ferrera.
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putting work at the heart of social policy, the social investment 
approach discriminates against those in the most dire need and 
undermines the principles of protection and solidarity that are 
central to European welfare policies.
the welfare states in a context of taxpayer resistance to the 
rising cost of programmes perceived (however inaccurately) 
to be predominantly redistributive. What distinguishes the 
social investment approach is that its focus is much more on 
‘capacitating’ interventions than on those which compensate. 
In this sense, social investment is about raising human and 
social capital to prevent future problems that could require 
costlier interventions.11
An interesting way of looking at this stronger role of the state 
is that it provides an active approach to the challenges posed 
by many long-term socio-ecological transitions. Ageing needs 
to be managed, as does climate change or societal evolution. 
‘Active’ labour market policies that enhance human capital, 
rather than the more traditional passive income support for 
the economically inactive, can equip an economy to meet 
challenges such as decarbonization or the growth of the 
knowledge economy, and help to provide the workforce with 
the new skills required.
Some critics of social investment point to its correlation with 
what has become known as the ‘Matthew effect’, deriving 
from verse 13.12 of the Gospel of Matthew in the Bible, which 
states: ‘for whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he 
shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from 
him shall be taken away even that he hath’.12,13 They argue 
that too many of its benefits accrue to middle-class citizens, 
examples being increases in childcare support or favourable 
treatment for private pensions. The wider concern expressed by 
bodies such as the European Anti-Poverty Network is that by 
11  Nathalie Morel, Bruno Palier and Joakim Palme (eds), Towards a Social 
Investment Welfare State? Ideas, Policies and Challenges (Bristol: Policy 
Press, 2012).
12  For example Bea Cantillon, ‘The paradox of the social investment state: 
growth, employment and poverty in the Lisbon era’, Journal of European 
Social Policy, 21:5, 2011, pp. 432–49.
13 King James Bible, Authorized Version (KJV).
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but will still have to deal with ageing before long. Overall, the 
proportion of the population aged 65 or over in the EU28 is 
projected to rise steadily from 18.9 per cent in 2015 to 23.9 
per cent in 2030 and 28.1 per cent in 2050.16
The challenge this presents for the welfare state has several 
dimensions. The first relates to the simple arithmetic of the 
‘piggy bank’ function: more pensioners, living longer increases 
the financial burden unless countervailing action is taken. 
Provision of care, sheltered housing or other social services 
adds to the financial challenges, while also requiring suitably 
qualified labour. In appraising the costs, it is important to 
note that the distinction between fully capitalized funding 
(through which pension funds own the assets from which the 
income flows pay pensions) and pay-as-you-go systems (which 
rely on raising revenue from today’s taxpayers and social 
charges) may affect the details, but does not fundamentally 
alter the arithmetic of a falling working population having to 
support a growing dependent population. However, it does 
raise governance questions around fairness, mechanisms, 
legitimation and transparency.
Immigration can mitigate the impact of the demographic shift, 
particularly if migrants are predominantly younger working-age 
people who are motivated to work. However, the difficulties 
European countries have had in coping with would-be migrants 
crossing the Mediterranean illustrate the political and social 
obstacles to higher immigration across the EU, even in 
Germany which has been more receptive to migrants than many 
other EU countries. Moreover, there have been instances of 
specific problems associated with integrating immigrants and 
resulting tensions. The evident problem here is that the blurred 
boundary between, on the one hand, those trying to come 
to Europe as economic migrants and, on the other, refugees 
16  EUROSTAT, EUROPOP2013 projections, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database?node_code=proj.
While Europe’s governments have developed an elaborate 
system of social protections and incentives for their citizens, its 
welfare states are now under threat from a number of directions. 
Principal among these are demographic change, the pressures 
at national level from economic globalization, the increasingly 
explicit EU-level requirements for national budget discipline, 
and the changing nature of work. Dealing with climate change 
is also widely recognized as a core challenge, likely to generate 
new social risks that welfare states are ill-equipped to manage. 
An obvious example is fuel poverty resulting from rising energy 
prices. But there are also opportunities; targeted energy 
efficiency measures (better insulation of the European housing 
stock, for example) would help to reduce carbon emissions and 
address fuel poverty. The many dimensions of ‘sustainability’ 
are, therefore, also germane to the future of the welfare state.
Demographic change
Population ageing will affect all European countries, albeit 
at different rates and times. The populations of Finland and 
Germany are already starting to decline and are projected to fall 
sharply up to 2050, with ramifications for the labour market 
and the financial sustainability of each country’s welfare state. 
The German workforce, for example, is projected to shrink by 
between 11.1 per cent and 18.7 per cent (depending on the 
scenario) by 2030 compared to today,14 while the country’s old-
age dependency ratio (the ratio of elderly dependents to the 
working population) is expected to rise to about 0.45, from 
0.31 in 2010.15 Ireland is at the other end of the spectrum, 
14  Mathias Dolls, Karina Doorley, Hilmar Schneider and Eric Sommer, 
Demographic change in Europe: The labor market and fiscal effects in 
2030, NEUJOBS Working Paper D 10.8, January 2014, http://www.neujobs.
eu/sites/default/files/publication/2014/10/D10.8_final%20version_.pdf.
15  Alari Paulus, Sebastian Siegloch and Eric Sommer, Increasing the 
Retirement Age to Counter Population Aging? Evidence from the EU27, 
NEUJOBS Working Paper D 10.10, June 2014, http://www.neujobs.eu/
sites/default/files/publication/2014/10/NEUJOBS_D1010_revision.pdf.
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contributing to the funding of the welfare system, immigrants 
can end up placing additional burdens on it.
European integration
Public debt has risen significantly across the EU to a weighted 
average in a range around 90 per cent of GDP. While some of 
the blame for this can be attributed to the need for certain 
governments to bail out parts of their financial sectors 
following imprudent lending in the lead-up to the 2008–09 
financial crisis, sustaining welfare commitments at a time of 
declining economic competitiveness in an increasingly open 
world economy has also contributed to the rise. A further 
significant rise in debt levels would become unsustainable.
Given the integrated nature of European economies through 
the single market, reducing government deficits and debt 
has become a central priority for European governments and 
the EU as a whole. Although the mix of welfare expenditure 
in each EU member state is driven by national politics and 
policies, coordinating reform responses at the EU level has 
become, in many cases, the only way for national governments 
to overcome domestic vested interests that seek to protect 
specific aspects of welfare. Past examples of such coordination 
included the convergence criteria established in advance of 
the Maastricht Treaty to determine which countries would join 
the single currency, and the Stability and Growth Pact agreed 
at the launch of monetary union in 1999. More recently, the 
EU’s economic governance has been deepened to embrace the 
‘semester’ process through which the European Commission 
now scrutinizes member states’ economic policies and, for the 
euro area members, annual budgets.
One consequence of the creation of a single market in the 
EU allowing free movement of goods, services and capital 
Drivers of Change
fleeing oppressive regimes has inhibited rational debate about 
the potential role of immigrants in countering the ageing of 
populations.
Globalization
Globalization is reducing European governments’ ability 
to sustain or reform welfare institutions and arrangements 
independently. For example, currently elaborate and often 
expensive welfare provision is frequently funded by requiring 
European employers to pay a labour tax or social charge for 
each worker employed. At a time of mobile capital and a global 
race to attract foreign investment, European countries with 
relatively high welfare charges find domestic companies moving 
increasing proportions of their operations to locations with 
lower labour costs, whether inside or outside Europe. Similarly, 
restrictions on firing workers as a means of minimizing the 
social exclusion caused by unemployment can lead to companies 
taking employment ‘offshore’. Remedies include shifting the 
tax base, e.g. to environmental taxes (part of the attraction 
lies in taxing ‘bads’ rather than ‘goods’ such as labour), but 
care is needed not to create new problems as a result of 
unintended consequences. A poorly designed carbon tax, for 
instance, could aggravate fuel poverty for poor households and 
damage competitiveness by raising energy costs, particularly if 
European standards are out of step with those in other Western 
economies and emerging markets.
In several European countries high unemployment has been 
exacerbated by the tension between restrictive labour markets 
and the pressures on companies to earn high returns on capital. 
Restrictive labour regulations can undermine the demographic 
dividend for European countries that comes from taking in 
younger immigrants, by making it hard to integrate newcomers 
into the labour force. Instead of finding work quickly, thereby 
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for a rethinking of entitlements. The shift away from the male-
breadwinner model is still a work in progress, even though it is 
increasingly essential at a time when Europe’s overall workforce 
is shrinking as the population ages. As this process unfolds, 
certain aspects of the welfare model, such as the provision of 
public support for childcare or child benefit, will increase in 
importance.
The general need for increased immigration to compensate 
for ageing populations and the reality of growing numbers of 
migrants coming from and through the Middle East and North 
Africa are posing additional challenges to European welfare 
states. Local services, from schools to hospitals, have to cope 
with more young people entering primary public education 
and more elderly people requiring public support. In some EU 
countries, there is evidence of immigrants’ families suffering 
social exclusion. Nevertheless, EU agreements in areas such as 
pension portability can at least underpin intra-EU migration 
and allow EU residents to take advantage of opportunities to 
move freely, whether for work or retirement.
Technology, innovation and the changing mix 
of jobs
New technologies and structural changes in economies are bound 
to affect the welfare state and the nature of jobs. Productivity 
growth is at the heart of economic growth and generally to 
be welcomed, but in a period of slow growth there can be 
a tension between maintaining jobs and introducing labour-
saving innovations. Fears that jobs will disappear, leading 
to pervasive unemployment, often prove to be misplaced. 
But periods of transformation undeniably create winners and 
losers. In all EU countries, the trend has been for the share of 
service activities in the economy to grow and that of industry 
to decline, with implications for the types of jobs that are 
was the need for free movement of labour. In theory, this 
provides a means of absorbing economic shocks affecting 
only part of the EU, because workers will be attracted to the 
more dynamic countries and regions, rather than languishing 
in unemployment. Free movement of labour then led to the 
concept of a European welfare model, enshrined in the EU’s 
Social Chapter, which stipulated EU-wide rights for workers – 
ranging from rights to holidays to limits on the number of hours 
someone can be obliged to work. However, a frequently heard 
academic argument is that the market-making associated with 
European integration (referred to in the literature as ‘negative 
integration’) has long been politically easier to achieve than 
common social regulation aimed at curbing market excesses 
(known as ‘positive integration’). In the European context, 
Fritz Scharpf has argued that member states converge towards 
an integrated liberal market economy model which at the same 
time substantively obstructs the embedding of a strong social 
dimension in EU policies.17
Changes in the family structure/societal 
change
EU welfare states are facing reform pressures from societal 
changes that create new demands for social provision while 
affecting the basis for welfare funding. In particular, the 
significant increase in the participation rate of women in the 
labour force in large parts of Europe over the past two to three
decades (see Figure 7 for the evolution in Germany) has raised 
demand for publicly funded childcare. It has also led to calls 
17  Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The Asymmetry of European Integration or why the EU 
cannot be a “Social Market Economy”’, Socio-Economic Review, 8:2, 2010‚ 
pp. 211–50. His characterization of the newly evolving European model 
draws on the work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), as 
well as on Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: 
The Institutional Foundations of Competitiveness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).
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very different rates of unemployment among them testify to 
the divergence in their ability to achieve this objective. In 
Germany and the United Kingdom, low unemployment rates 
are at least in part attributable to the way job preservation 
was stressed (belying the ‘hire and fire’ image of the latter), 
although critics argue that this was only possible because of 
resort to precarious forms of employment, such as ‘Kurzarbeit’ 
in Germany or ‘zero hours’ contracts in the United Kingdom. 
In other countries, such as Spain, job losses were substantial. 
These differences also reflected the incidence of the recession. 
Ireland and Spain suffered big downturns in construction, a 
sector less likely to retain employees when demand falls.
created or lost. There is also some evidence that ‘green’ jobs 
are increasing, albeit from a low base, raising questions about 
the skills and associated training that such a shift may require. 
Both the European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training (CEDEFOP), which analyses skills needs for the EU, 
and the OECD stress the importance of ‘transversal’ green skills 
– that is, skills applicable to a broad range of environmental 
tasks – rather than occupation-specific ones.18
For European countries, one of the issues that surfaced during 
the crisis years was how to maintain employment levels. The 
18 OECD and CEDEFOP, Greener Skills and Jobs (Paris: OECD, 2014).
* Ratio of female to male of proportion of a country’s working-age population (ages 15 and older) that engages in the labour market, either by working or actively looking 
   for work, expressed as a percentage of the working-age population.
Sources: UN Development Programme; Key Indicators on the Labour Market (7th edition, Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2013).
Figure 7 | Labour force participation rate (female–male ratio)*, Germany
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The European Commission, just prior to the crisis, had espoused 
‘flexicurity’ – an approach combining flexible labour markets, 
fairly generous social protection, and activation policies 
– as its favoured model. In a number of countries this was 
criticized as an anti-worker policy. Germany, however, offers 
an example of the successful application of this approach, 
having undergone significant deregulation of its labour market 
following reunification. This is in contrast to what happened 
in France, where the scope for creating ‘non-standard’ jobs as a 
means of averting higher unemployment proved more limited.19
The European welfare model is also challenged by polarization 
in the labour market. Europe continues to generate a healthy 
number of high-skilled jobs. It also has steady demand for 
lower-skilled jobs in areas such as care and other personal 
services. However, there is evidence of a hollowing-out of jobs 
in the middle of the range of skills distribution. This is largely 
as a result of technological change, although the pattern varies 
among member states.20 An increase in high-skilled jobs has 
most recently given way to renewed growth at the lower end 
of the skills distribution. An associated trend is an upsurge in 
part-time jobs, which raises challenges for states that base 
entitlements to various forms of welfare provision on full-time 
work.
19  Christian Dustmann, Bernd Fitzenberger, Uta Schönberg and Alexandra 
Spitz-Oener, ‘From Sick Man of Europe to Economic Superstar: Germany’s 
Resurgent Economy’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28:1, 2014, pp. 
167–188; Wendy Carlin, Anke Hassel, Andrew Martin and David Soskice, 
‘The transformation of the German model’, in Jon Erik Dolvik and Andrew 
Martin (eds), European Social Models from Crisis to Crisis (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014).
20  Eurofound, ‘Upgrading or polarisation? Long-term or global shifts in 
the employment structure’, European Jobs Monitor 2015 (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2015).
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arise and when government failures might be just as bad, if 
not worse.
Moreover, the social risks against which welfare states provide 
insurance or support arise everywhere; if they were not dealt 
with by the welfare state, they would have to be resolved by 
other means. For example, the growing difficulties in financing 
pay-as-you-go pension systems have led many policy-makers 
to advocate a transition to funded pension schemes, not 
least to benefit from the high returns on investments that 
capital markets yield. But as noted above, both systems are 
equally sensitive to demographic change. In a funded scheme 
individuals acquire claims on future consumption over their 
working lives, accumulated in pension funds. Upon retiring, 
those claims will be realized, and the nominally accumulated 
assets or monetary funds used for consumption. Since overall 
output, however, does not increase, the burden shouldered by 
the economically active population is the same as in a pay-as-
you-go system.
There are potentially even more intractable challenges associated 
with the increasing demands that ageing populations, who are 
also living longer, are imposing on stretched public healthcare 
and long-term care systems. New medical breakthroughs, which 
are obviously good news for individual health and welfare, 
often result in substantial additional costs, while expectations 
of care provision can rise. The conjunction of an ageing 
society and the higher probability that older people will vote, 
and campaign for higher public spending that favours them, 
raises difficult questions around democratic decision-making in 
relation to the welfare state.
Although a long-term solution to ageing costs could involve 
policies to increase fertility, it cannot improve matters before 
the next cohort enters the labour market. Moreover, more 
children may create an additional burden of dependency. Unless 
Economic concerns
Given the drivers of change examined above, a frequently 
expressed view is that Europe can no longer afford the welfare 
state that was one of the mainstays of its social models during 
the postwar period. The ‘Merkel formula’ that 7 per cent of 
the world’s population producing 25 per cent of global output 
cannot sustain 50 per cent of global social protection spending 
implies that European welfare states have become unaffordable. 
The message is that by continuing to accept such a burden, 
European economies are rendering themselves uncompetitive 
in global markets and that welfare states have to change (and 
would have needed to do so even without the squeeze on 
public finances of recent years).
The other side to the story is that well-designed welfare states 
can promote sustainable growth, potentially increasing the size 
of the overall welfare ‘pie’ in addition to determining how it is 
sliced. This prompts the question of whether current provisions 
in Europe, most of which are mediated through the public 
sector, are appropriate. Some welfare arrangements in Europe 
manifestly need recalibration or even wide-ranging reform, but 
others can be shown to be necessary and efficient.
In his work on the economics of the welfare state, Nick Barr 
is critical of the woolly thinking that fails to distinguish 
between the objectives and the means of delivery of different 
welfare state provisions.21 In many European systems, the right 
to healthcare, social provision and so on is often conjoined 
with the idea that it must be produced by the state. There 
are certainly sound arguments that public risk-pooling can 
be better and more efficient than private provision, as noted 
by the prime example of the vastly expensive US healthcare 
system. However, care is needed to identify why market failures 
21 Barr, The Economics of the Welfare State.
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emancipation of women and the virtual elimination of absolute 
poverty are rightly celebrated as achievements. Although the 
2008–09 financial crisis has resulted in the return of poverty 
and mass unemployment in the worst-affected countries, and 
increased use of food-banks in others, three of the five ‘giant 
evils’ listed by William Beveridge in his 1942 report that laid 
the basis for the postwar UK welfare state – disease, squalor and 
ignorance (the others were want and idleness) – are no longer 
endemic in European societies as they were in the early postwar 
years. Instead, the new social risks have to be summed up with 
a different array of watchwords, such as exclusion, inequality, 
lack of opportunity, frailty and transitions over the life-course. 
It can also be argued that while advances in healthcare have 
largely eradicated many of the diseases, such as tuberculosis 
and polio, that afflicted European societies in Beveridge’s day, 
new healthcare challenges have to be confronted. Obesity, 
lifestyle-related cancers, mental health problems and the 
growth of age-related dementia are among the contemporary 
health concerns reshaping demands on welfare systems, often 
for chronic rather than acute care.
To the extent that welfare states with a mix of family, retirement 
and survivor benefits were designed for a typical working-life 
pattern, it was that of the full-time male manual worker as 
the principal breadwinner. In many welfare states, especially in 
southern Europe, the family remained a key part of the model, 
providing care and shelter for younger, older or incapacitated 
members. Greater social mobility, changing gender roles and 
rising expectations of public services have all contributed to 
an evolving societal model which is reshaping social policy 
demands.
As a result, new risks have to be confronted and new 
expectations of welfare states recognized. The new issues 
include various forms of social exclusion, dealing with single 
parents where family structures fail to cope, new vectors of 
the systems change, the decline in the number of people paying 
into the pension system and the increase in those drawing on 
it could lead to growing pressures on public budgets. There are, 
nevertheless, approaches to stabilizing outlays on pensions, 
for example by linking them to GDP growth, such that the cost 
of pensions is prevented from rising excessively. Over a 10- to 
20-year horizon, therefore, there are four possible solutions for 
easing the cost of ageing. These are:
•  Increasing the effective age at which ‘piggy bank’ benefits 
become payable by altering the balance between the working 
lifetime and the projected period of inactivity (noting that, 
as in the recent German pension reform, fairness dictates 
that years worked, as well as the official retirement age, 
have to be taken into account). Early-retirement schemes 
favoured for reasons of providing jobs for young entrants 
into the labour market have proved in the past to be a 
mistaken policy response.
•  Reducing the generosity of payments and services offered 
to the elderly.
•  Raising additional revenue from the working population, 
including by boosting the latter’s size by attracting 
immigrant workers.
•  Investing abroad to generate a future flow of income, 
emulating the example of Norway’s massive sovereign 
wealth fund.
Social concerns
An underlying dilemma is that many of the core assumptions 
on which welfare states were constructed are no longer 
tenable. Longer life expectancy, much improved health, the 
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does the ‘long goodbye to Bismarck’22 signal that the time is 
ripe to rethink the fundamentals of welfare states based on 
the contributory principle? Yet as Esping-Andersen observes, 
there is no clear direction for where Bismarckian welfare 
states go next, although he notes the general trend towards 
the introduction of a basic safety net through some variant 
on minimum income.23 A related issue is whether, despite the 
continuing resistance of many member states, closer economic 
integration may warrant an EU-wide (or at least eurozone-wide) 
unemployment insurance scheme of the sort mooted by the 
former European commissioner, László Andor.24
In a relatively closed economy with stable employment, funding 
the welfare state through social charges shared between employers 
and employees is viable, but with intensifying global competition, 
what labour economists describe as the ‘wedge’ between labour 
costs and wages becomes a difficulty. Where, as in certain EU 
countries, the wedge is half or more on top of wages, it can have 
a debilitating effect on competitiveness, over and above the cost 
in terms of the share of GDP. Ageing compounds the problem, if it 
means a rising welfare burden alongside a shrinking contributory 
base, even if more welfare spending comes out of general taxation 
rather than from a tax on labour.
More efficient delivery of welfare state provisions ought to be 
uncontroversial, and there is undoubtedly scope, in particular, 
for more and (crucially) better use of information technology 
in this regard.
22  Borrowing the phrase from Bruno Palier, A Long Goodbye to Bismarck: the 
Politics of Welfare Reform in Continental Europe (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2010).
23   Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ‘Foreword’, in Palier, A Long Goodbye to 
Bismarck.
24  For example László Andor, ‘Basic European unemployment insurance: 
Countering divergences within the Economic and Monetary Union’, 
speech at the Vienna University of Economics and Business, Europa Press 
Release, 29 September 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
SPEECH-14-635_en.htm.
poverty and various dimensions of equality. In some cases, 
increasing segmentation of the labour market is leading 
to concerns about how to ensure that ‘outsiders’ are fairly 
treated, but also about whether supposedly standard models 
of employment fit the new context. A link with environmental 
sustainability has been posited by a number of authors, but the 
consequences for policy choices remain to be clarified.
Governance concerns
In all these areas, there are governance issues to resolve. A first 
is the balance between public and private provision in some of 
the most costly components of social policy. Even though the 
economic crisis of the past few years has been profound and 
has lasted longer than previous cyclical downturns, European 
societies (with obvious exceptions, such as Greece) are richer 
than they have ever been.
None the less, a narrative of the unaffordability of the welfare 
state has taken hold. In this regard, a distinction has to be 
made between the short-term imperative of restoring the 
sustainability of public finances and the much more contentious 
question of limits to the size of the state. Equally, the public/
private dichotomy concerns the choices for individuals about 
how much they have to save, when they spend it and how their 
welfare entitlements are determined.
An associated question is how to organize welfare provision. In 
some EU countries, the state is the prime actor, while others 
delegate to specialist executive agencies or assign responsibility 
to social partners, such as employers’ organizations and trade 
unions. National tradition is, plainly, central to what is done, 
but there may also be reasons to break with established norms: 
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Resistance is often substantial, partly for the familiar reason 
that disruptive technological change will mean that some 
jobs will be lost and that established models of managing 
activities have to be reformed. Equally, there is a growing body 
of evidence on new and experimental approaches that can be 
transformative. For example, Sitra (a Finnish public fund and 
one of the partners in this project) has examined a range of 
innovations and suggested how they could be implemented in 
improving approaches to government functions.25 In a world of 
increased short- and long-term pressures on public finances, 
it will be incumbent on decision-makers to accelerate the 
adoption of such innovations.
25  Yves Doz and Mikko Kosonen, Government for the Future: Building the 
Strategic and Agile State, Sitra Studies 80, 2014, https://www.sitra.fi/ 
julkaisut/Selvityksi%C3%A4-sarja/Selvityksia80.pdf.
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for Achieving Them
The welfare state offers a comprehensive response to social 
risks which, if not covered by the state, would still arise.27 
Critics often overlook the fact that the welfare state deals 
with these risks efficiently.28 Instead, the question Europeans 
need to answer, not least in pondering the ‘Merkel formula’, 
is whether the costs of ‘non-social’ responses would be lower.
New employment patterns are an acknowledged, if often 
insufficiently understood, part of the picture. As noted above, 
the median worker today is no longer a man employed in a 
factory, but is as likely to be a woman as a man, working in 
an office, hospital or care service. Careers evolve and may 
be subject to sharp changes of direction. Work–life balance 
is an objective that can have pronounced effects on welfare 
arrangements. In the light of these transformations, the 
answer may be to reinforce moves already apparent in some EU 
countries towards a system in which entitlement is based on 
citizenship rather than employment history.
A more pessimistic scenario of the future of European welfare 
states follows the argument of Fritz Scharpf mentioned above 
that, due to the inherent bias towards negative integration, 
the formation of a European social market economy with a 
strong social dimension is impossible. Instead, EU member 
states will converge towards a liberal welfare model, entailing 
retrenchment of the welfare state, especially in the social-
democratic countries (following the Esping-Andersen 
conceptualization).
27  Iain Begg, ‘Rethinking the Social Dimension of the EU: The Costs of Non-
Social Policy’, in Alexandra Baum-Cesig and Anne Faber, Soziales Europa? 
Perspektiven des Wohlfahrtsstaates im Kontext von Europäisierung und 
Globalisierung [Social Europe? Prospects for the Welfare State in the 
Context of European Integration and Globalization] (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 
für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005).
28  Eloi Laurent, Le bel avenir de l’Etat Providence [The bright future of the 
welfare state] (Paris: LLL, 2014).
The welfare state is a defining feature of European societies, 
and the values which underpin it are deeply embedded in 
them. Differences between European countries are small 
compared with the gulf between Europe and many other parts 
of the world, and what Europe has is widely envied. Those 
contemplating reforms of social models and policies should not 
overlook the abiding strengths of European welfare states, even 
if it is accepted that major challenges arising from the drivers 
of change discussed above have to be confronted.
Moreover, as John Hills explains, the welfare state’s influence is 
pervasive and affects opportunities for all strata of society, not 
just those currently claiming particular benefits. Hills finds that 
for most income groups, what they receive over their lifetimes 
from the welfare state broadly matches what they contribute. 
Only the top decile of the income distribution makes relatively 
lower (though still sizeable) demands on welfare systems, while 
the bottom decile receives relatively more.26 In this sense the 
welfare state in all EU countries has to be seen as part of the 
fabric of society and not as an overblown and costly liability.
Transformation of the welfare state cannot, however, be avoided, 
so it is pertinent to ask towards what, for whom and how? It is 
worth stressing, first, that austerity and the aftermath of the 
financial crisis are largely short-term considerations. Certainly, 
welfare states need to be fiscally sustainable. Countries that 
have allowed social spending to race ahead of fiscal capacity 
will have to rein in the excesses. Equally, however, the 
proposition that welfare spending needs to decline sharply as a 
proportion of GDP is a false one. 
26  John Hills, Good Times, Bad Times: the Welfare Myth of Them and Us 
(Bristol: Policy Press, 2014).
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Choices have to be made, and the means by which decisions 
are taken invites examination, particularly where new demands 
(e.g. for enhanced childcare provision) can only be met if other 
spending is reduced. It is well known that welfare states are 
‘sticky’, in the sense of being politically resistant to change – if 
only because losers from reform are bound to shout louder than 
new winners. Politicians apprehensive about losing elections 
find it easy to shy away from necessary reforms.
Nevertheless, as Anton Hemerijck, taking issue with some of 
the more negative assessments, asserts: ‘both the welfare state 
and EU, two major feats of mid-twentieth century institutional 
engineering, have at critical times been able to reinvent 
themselves’.29
29 Hemerijck, Changing Welfare States.
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